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Draft Recommendation
on the role of Europe in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Asscmbly,
(t) Welcomrng thc fact that srnce the signature of the "Peace Agreement on Bosrua and Herzegovtna"
in Pans on l4 December 1995. a cessatlon of hostilities has been estabhshed:
0r) Convrnced that the presence of a robustly' armed. rvell-equrpped and extenstve multinatronal
mrlrtarl'Implementatron Force (IFOR) has been an indrspensable mstrument for keeping the peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovma,
0t,) Notrng ruth satrsfactron that the Repubhc of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entrtres havc
redeploved therr forces m three phases as strpulatcd in Artrcle IV of the Agreement on the mrlitary
aspects of the peace settlement.
(O Arvare that the 14 September 1996 clcctrons have merell' confirmed the ambrtions of the
nationalist leaders, contran' to the spirrt of the Dalton Agreement rvhich envisaged the creation of
viable democratic and multi-ethruc mstrtutrons;
(t) Regretttng that lvrth a feu' exceptrons, all the indicted u'ar criminals are strll at large because
neither the parties to the Dalton Agreement nor IFOR has been urlling to arrest thcm and bnng them to
the International Crimrnal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia in The Hague,
(v) Convmced that there can be no reconcihation m Bosnra and Herzegovma unless rndivrduals
rndrcted for thc appalling war crimes commrtted have been ludged b1' Thc Haguc tnbunal,
(wt) A.ivarc that more than five million land mrnes are still causmg senous problcms for the populatron
and that mrne-clearrng, a responsibrlity of the former partres to the conflrct. is takrng place at a very
slorv pace. rf at all.
(vly' Notrng that IFOR rs playing an important and indrspcnsablc role in provrding additional support
to the OSCE for tasks related to the implementahon of the sub-regronal arms control agreement and the
Vrenna Agreement on confidence-buildrng measurcs srgned b1' five partles in former Yugoslavta under
the ausprces of the OSCE,
(tO Notrng that the Internatronal Police Task Force lacks the human resources and equipment to
rmplement its main task of helping to re-estabhsh the rule of lalv in Bosnia and Herzegovtna.
(x) Convinced that there rs a need for a European-run public securiq' force u-htch should be an armed
bodl', more substantral ln slze and better equrpped but rvith the same gencral mandate as the IPTF and
able to implement rt without the support of an IFOR successor force,
(xi) Convinced that thc results of the equip and train programme undcr thc ausprces of the United
States ma1, nulhfi' the arm of the Dayton Agreement and that mstead of supplying nerv rveapons. the
main effort should norv be directed at achieving an even balance b1'reducrng arms all round;
(ni) Noting that the freedom of movement and the return and rescttlcment of refugees and displaced
persons. one of the core oblectives of the DaWon Agrecment. has by, no means been achieved to date;
(xur) Consrdering that, under the present circumstances, the organisatron of munrcipal elections in
Bosnra. for rvhrch the partres are apparentll'not prepared, but for u'hrch IFOR has a mandate to provrde
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asslstance and support, \\'ould sevcreh' undermine the position and credibrlitv of IFOR and anl
successor force;
(nv) Aware that as a consequence of the slouness rvrth w'hich new civil structures are being set up and
of the strong rivalrl'that still exrsts betu,een the vanous ethnic groups, IFOR rvill have to be replaced bv
a successor force rf Europe and rts allies \\'ant to make sure that Bosnia rs not plunged into \\'ar agaln.
(xv) Convrnced that a Unitcd Statcs decislon not to contribute a substantial contrngent of ground
troops to an IFOR succcssor force u'ould put both the rmplementation of the Dalton Agrcement and the
future of Atlantrc coopcration at nsk.
(wr) Consrdering that the assrstance and support u'hrch IFOR is supposcd to provide for a multitude of
internahonal humarutarran organrsatrons is havmg an adverse lmpact on rts effectlveness and that morc
attentron should be pard to coordination betrveen IFOR and thosc organrsatrons rn order to rmprove the
use ofits preclous rcsources,
RECOMMENDS THAT TFIE COTINCIL
I Strongly endorse the establishment of an IFOR successor force u'ith a mandate up to and
includrng the electrons rn 1998 and urth the full particrpation of a substantial contingent of US ground
troops,
2. Senousll,examine the issue of mine-clearing rn the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovlna, glvrng
consrderation to the possibilitv of a WEU mrne-cleanng operation in that country;
3 Consider the possibility of cstabhshrng a successor force to the International Policc Task Force
(IPTF) u'hich should be an armed bodl' under WEU command. more substantral in srze and better
equrpped, but rvith the samc gcneral mandate as the IPTF and able to rmplemcnt rt u'ithout the support
of an IFOR successor force:
4 Insist that munrcrpal electrons m Bosrua and Herzegovma be postponed untrl spring 1997 at the
earliest, b1,u'hrch trme the condrtrons for their organisatron mav have rmproved
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ExPlanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr Blaauw, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. After four vears of unparalleled atrocitres
in a conflrct u'hrch clarmed the lives of more than
260 000 pcople, devastated 60%o of propertl' and
a largc part of the rnfrastructure of Bosrua, the
Dayton Agreement, notrvrthstandrng rts
recognrsed shortcommgs. has brought relief to all
concemed
2 For the populatron rn Bosnia, rt has given
hope for a futurc urthout rvar and created the
basrc condrtions to enable rt to start reburlding
the countrl'and its polrtrcal rnstrtutrons
3. For the internatronal commurutr'. rt has
created a framework for reahsrng at least somc of
its ambrtrons to help the Bosruans establish a
credible state u'hrch can en1oi' normal rclattons
with other states,
4 A vrtal part of the Dalton Agreement rs
the "Agreement on the mrlrtary aspects of the
peace settlement". ln u'hrch the parties "welcome
the urlhngness of the rnternational commurutl' to
send to the rcgron, for a period of approximately
one )'ear. a force to assrst m rmplementation of
the tcrrrtonal and other military provrsions of the
agreement" Thc dcdrcated efforts of thrs
implementatlon force, IFOR. have prevented the
former \\.arrrng parhes from engagrng rn further
hostrlrties Apart from this, IFOR has taken
manv initiatives to help restore peace and start
rebuilding the countn'
5. According to its mandate. IFOR rs
supposed to pull out at the end of 1996
Obvrousll', Bosnia and Herzegovma is not vet
ready to be left on its oun There rs general
agreement among both the countries partrcrpating
rn IFOR and the former \\'arnng parties that an
IFOR successor force rs needed, since there is
still much to be done to rmplement the Dalton
Agreement rn full, and also because Bosrua and
Herzegovma needs a breathing space.
6 The ob.lective of the present report is to
re\.le\\' the acluevements of the past r-ear and to
issess rvhat Europc and the rnternational
commuruty' could do to promote the further
rmplementation of the Dalton Agreement
II. Establishment and mandate of the
Impl ementation Force (I FOR)
7 Thc Darton Agreement provided for the
creatron of a 60 000 strong mrlrtary force under
NATO command to enforce the ceasefire of 5
October 1995 and to help implement a divrsron of
Bosrua mto tu'o entrtres shanng a loose polrtrcal
structure
8. This rntcmatronal rmplementatron force
(IFOR) rvas to enforce the urthdrarval of former
u'arring factrons from a zone of separatron and to
make them leave an agreed area of land to be
exchanged ruthm 45 davs IFOR u'ould also
have to oversee and enforce the removal or
dismanthng of mmes and other weapons from the
zones of separatlon and the storing of all hcary
\\'capons rn desrgnated places urthm a period of
120 da1's after the formal ceremon)' to srgn the
Agrccmcnt
9. The Dalton Agreement provided IFOR
uith a farrlv extensrve mandate u'hich, apart
from the abovementroned tasks, also rncluded
such tasks as facrlrtatrng refugees' freedom of
mol'ement and rescttlement and the u'ork of
humarutanan aid organrsatrons, resolving
boundarl' drsputes. creatmg secure conditrons for
free elections and respondrng to violence agarnst
crvrhans
10. A total of 15 NATO member states and 19
non-NATO member states contnbuted troops for
the establishment of IFOR Iceland partrcipated
rvith non-mrlrtarl'means to shou' sohdarrtl, On
28 November 1995, NATO and Russia agreed to
estabhsh a 1oint "consultative commissron" rvhich
u'ould allolr, Russran forces to operate under
United States as opposed to NATO command
11. A Russran brrgade of around I 500 men
u,as based near Brcko in an arca controlled by'
Bosnran Serbs Its commander cooperates wrth
IFOR through thc intermedrary of General
George Joulu'an m hrs capacity as Commander-
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rn-Chref of US troops rn Europe A
Coordmatrng Commrttee l6+N n'as creatcd to
ensure smooth implementatron of the mandatc of
IFOR. ln rvhich so manv natrons \\'ere
cooperatmg
12. For thc deplol'mcnt of IFOR. the Bosnian
ternton'u'as drvrded mto threc sectors.
- 
a US-controlled "sector north" urth
headquartcrs rn Tuzla and urcludrng troop
contnbutions from the Unitcd States.
Turker'. Russia. Nonval'. Su'eden.
Denmark, Poland. Hungarv. Latvra,
Lithuania. Estonra and Fmland.
- 
a Bntish-controlled "sector south-u'cst"
urth hcadquartcrs ongmallr' rn Gomlr
Vakuf but nou' ur Banla Luka. and
mcludrng troop contnbutrons from the
Uruted Kurgdom. thc Netherlands,
Canada. Palustan, the Czech Repubhc
and Malavsra.
a French-controlled "sector south-east"
wrth hcadquarters m Mostar and
rncludrng troop contributrons from
France, Italr,'. Sparn. Portugal and
Luxembourg.
13 At the top of IFOR's command structurc
\\'as NATO's Supremc Alhed Commander
Europe (SACEUR), follou'ed bv NATO's
Commander-rn-Chief South (CINCSOUTH).
w'ho established field headquarters in Saralevo
and Zagreb. and the Commander of the Allied
Raprd Reactron Corps (COMARRC) based rn
Sara.levo. Finallv, thcrc $'erc threc multinatronal
drvrsron commanders s'ith headquarters in Tuzla,
Gornlr Vakuf (now' Iocated in Banla Luka) and
Mostar
14 On l8 Februan' 1996. SACEUR (Gencral
Joulu,an) rcported to NATO's Sccretan -General.
Javier Solana. that IFOR's deplol'ment had been
compieted
15. At the end of September 1996. the total
strength of the IFOR troops m Bosnia \\'as
almost 47 000 rncludrng about 39 000 troops, or
83%. from NATO member states and somc
8 000, or llo/o, from non-NATO member states
16 IFOR met the first deadhne in thc
rmplementatron of rts task on 19 January 1996,
u,hen rt announced thc cstabhshment of a four-
kilometre urdc zone of scparatron betlveen the
Mushm-Croat Fcderatron and the Serb entrtl'
17. In Januan' and Februar,r'. when Bosnran
Serbs hvrng in the suburbs of Sarajevo startcd
leavmg thcir homcs and burnrng thetr houses.
IFOR drd not prevent this. arguing that rt u'anted
to mamtarn rts rmpartralitv
l8 On 30 Januarl' 1996. former partrcs to the
conflrct rn Bosnra began to rvrthdralv therr hear,1'
\\'eapons. rvhich thev had to evacuatc from thc
sectors not assrgned to them b1' thc Darton
Agrccment b1' midnrght on Saturdav. 3 Februan'
1996 Thesc scctors u'erc to remain free of all
mrlrtan' presence. except for IFOR troops. up to
thc transfer ofcrvil authontr'45 davs later. on l9
March 1996
19. 81' the end of February', the former
\\'arnng factrons had alreadv ri'rthdrarin both
their mrlrtan'forces and therr equrpment from the
separatlon zone
20. By 19 March. D+90 of IFOR's operatlon.
a ten-krlomctre rvidc separation zone had been
established over a I 075 kilometre long mter-
ethnrc boundarl' hne At the same trmc. the
drvrsron of Bosnra and Herzegovrna lnto a
Muslim-Croat Fcdcratron urth 5l%o of Bosnian
ternton' and a Scrb Repubhc u'ith 49% of thc
terntory'took effect
2l Bv the D+120 dcadhnc. midnight on l8
Apnl 1996, all thc soldrers of the former rvarring
parhes $'ere to have rctumed to thcrr barracks
and have placcd all thcrr heavl' \\'eapons rn
dcsrgnated IFOR areas Generalll' speaking.
SACEUR considered that good progress had
been made but felt that, marnlv for technrcal
reasons. more trme uould be needed in order to
fully' compll' srth thc provisions of the Dayton
Agreemcnt. It lr'as thought that betu'een 200 000
and 300 000 soldrcrs should return to therr
barracks and that at lcast somc of them should be
demobrhscd
22 Apart from that, betrveen 5 000 and 6 000
pieces of hean,artrllerl'(includrng 800 tanks and
I 300 artillen' prcces) x'ere to be roundcd up.
23 Altogethcr. after 120 day's rn Bosnia.
IFOR had achreved many posrtrve results
During the D+I20 penod. 90%" of all tanks rverc
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placcd ln cantonment arcas. as \\crc tt5% of all
artrllcn' and 80-9-5% of all air defcnce svstcms.
frccdom of movcment rvas cnsured rn pnncrple.
roads u'crc opcncd. the ten-krlometrc separatron
zonc \\as cstabhshed. srx of the marn bridges
ovcr thc Sal'a "hnkrng Bosnra to Europe" u.ere
reparrcd. -19 othcrs u'cre rcburlt and numerous
engrnccnng proJCCts u'ere approl'ed
24 Aftcr har.'rng met rts D+t20 dcadhne.
IFOR. uhtle contrnulng to consrdcr the
rmplcmcntatron of rts mrlrtan tasks a prrontr'.
could afford to spend more tlmc rn assrstrng the
crvrl agcncrcs in Bosnra and Hcrzegovrna It
continucd to u'ork on thc reparr or rcbuildrng of
bridges. roads and rarlrrar s. and hclpcd to rcstorc
gas. u'ater and electncrtv supphcs. to rcburld
schools and hosprtals and rcstorc
te lccommunrcatlons
25 IFOR also provrdcd substantral assrstancc
to thc OSCE rn preparing and conductrng the 14
Scptcmber 1996 electrons It supportcd other
tntcmatronal and humanrtanan organisations rn
performrng therr tasks. not onlr' bv provrdrng a
securc environmcnt. but also bl supplvrng
emergcnc\'. logrstrc. mcdrcal and other
asslstancc. as u'ell as rnformatron
26 In order to facrlrtatc thcsc I'arrous tasks.
IFOR adaptcd rts force structure bv rcplacrng
hean'unrts u'rth morc mobrlc oncs It also tned
to help makc freedom of movcmcnt a realrtr'. but
thrs has proved to bc onc of thc most drfficult
tasks
27 The changes m the rmplcmentation of
IFOR's mandatc urll bc drscussed rn more dctarl
rn Chapter IX of the prcscnt report
III. 'I'he International Police Tusk Force (IPTF)
28 In accordance *rth Anncx I I to the
Darton Agrecment. an rnternatronal pohce task
force u'as crcatcd on the basrs of UN Sccuntl'
Councrl Rcsolutron 1035 of 2l Dccembcr 1995
The marn tasks of thrs pohcc forcc. as sct out m
Amex ll to the Darton Agrecment, lrcre to
obsen'e pohcc actl\'ltres and thc functronrng of
thc ludrcral s)'stem. to promote thc creatron of a
sccure and stablc cnvlronment for slectrons rn
Bosnia and to ovcrsee the re-estabhshment of the
Bosnran pohcc force
29 Dcputv Dcfcncc Mrnrster. Hasan Gengrc
of Bosnra and Hcrzegovlna. admrttcd that thc
restructunng of policc forccs \\'as a rathcr
comphcated rssuc and sard progress could onlr'
be madc step b1' step Frrst and foremost. thc
pohce rn the Fedcratron should start to \\.car one
and thc same unrform and opcratc under the same
rules One of thc anomahcs of thc organlsatron
of the pollcc forcc rn Bosnra and Herzcgovlna ls
that rn thc Fcdcratlon. authontv over thc pohcc
has bccn dcccntrahscd to the cantons. *hrlc rn
the Repubhka Srpska rt rs centrahsed undcr the
Nlnister of thc Intcnor Anothcr anomalv rs that
cach of thc cntrtres has a Mrnistcr of the Intcnor
but that rcsponsrbrlrt)' for 
.lustrce has bccn
ccntraltsed undcr a Justrcc Nhnrstcr ansrtcrable
to thc presrdcncv of Bosnra and Herzegovrna
Unde rstandablr'. local or regronal authontrcs
havc an rntcrcst rn controlhng the pohce. x'hosc
rolc rs l rtal rn dctcrmmmg thc succcss or farlurc
of thc ob.lectrvc of freedom of movemcnt and tho
return and resettlcmcnt of rcfugees and drsplaced
persons Thc Bosnran Govcrnmcnt rntends to
creatc a three-cntrtv statc border pohcc force
u'hrch should be dcpcndent on the prcsrdcnn' and
should not be hnked ruth the crr,'rhan larv
cnforccmcnt pohcc forces
30 The IPTF reachcd morc or less full
strength rn August 1996 u rth 1688 pohce
officers on secondmcnt from a largc number of
UN membcr statcs such as Germanr'. Francc. the
Nctherlands. the Unrtcd States. Eglpt. Honduras.
Ghana. Ncpal. Jordan and Pakrstan Of thc total
number. 531. or 3l 5%. ucrc contnbuted bv EU
countnes and I56. or 9 2u/u. b1'thc Unltcd Statcs
Duc to mternal problems. the IPTF has untrl non'
conccntrated on obsen'atron tasks. includrng lolnt
patrols *'ith local pohcc forccs and prison vrsrts
rn order to vcnfl obscn,ancc of human rrghts It
rs no\\'plannrng to pa)'morc attentron to hou'the
-ludrcral sr stcm functrons
31 Bosnran sourccs havc l'oiced thc cntrcrsm
that thc IPTF rs not vcry effcctrve. argurng that
thc forcc rs too small. that rts officcrs arc not
armed and that thcrc rs no proper coordinatron
bctq'ccn rt and IFOR.
32 Although thc IPTF u'as dchberatclv not
armcd. rt rs felt that undcr the prcscnt
crrcumstanccs rn Bosnia. carn lng a \\.eapon
*'ould definrtcll' lncrease thc hkchhood of UN
police officcrs bcrng able to rmplcment thcrr
tasks as set out rn the mandatc
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33 Another problem is that the composrtron of
thc IPTF ls ven' hetcrogeneous. n rth pohcc
officers commg from countnes urth drfferent
opmlons and practrccs regardrng thc rolc and task
of the pohce ln lau' cnforcement and thc
marntenance of public order.
31 Under its present mandatc. the IPTF rs
supposed to asscss thrcats to pubhc order and
advrse on the abrlrtl. of lau' cnforccment agencles
to deal urth such threats. Intcr-ethnrc clashes are
certarnlv an rssue for thc IPTF to deal u'ith but,
m lts prescnt statc. rt rs nerther cqurppcd nor
traincd for not control Untrl nou'. IFOR has
been rcqucstcd to rnten'ene in such srtuatrons.
but thrs mrlrtan' forcc also lacks the proper
mcans and tramrng to do the 1ob.
35 Noturthstanding some incrdcnts carlv on. a
good n'orkmg relatronshrp has no\\ bccn
estabhshed betrveen the IPTF and IFOR
rncludmg the posting of IFOR harson officcrs rn
all IPTF district headquarters and thcrr drspatch
to a number of smaller posts On several
occaslons, IFOR has intervcncd at the request of
the IPTF and has now bccn officrally' rnstructed
br NATO to come to the aid of IPTF personnel
36 The IPTF has onh'1ust started to morutor
the restructurrng of thc Bosnran pohcc force,
rncluding a consrderablc rcduction of its
complement of 40 000 pcrsonnel.
37 Under thc Davton Agreement. the IPTF
u'as sct up to hclp bnng order to Bosnia and to
facrlrtatc the elections and thc arrest of u'ar
crrmmals for trral at The Hague. It x'as to
cncourage the Bosnran police forcc to assumc thc
marn rolc m lau' enforcement and rnspcctron
Although thc u'ordrng of the mandatc u'as kept
vague. the IPTF can "assrst and advrsc" local
officials to locate and arrest rndrctcd \\'ar
criminals, llhich, under the Darton Agrccmcnt. rs
a task assigned to the srgnatory partres
38. Accordrng to rts mandatc, thc IPTF has
also been grven the rrght to scck support and
remforcement. should rt meet rvrth an)'
obstructron or "rcfusal to comply rvith an IPTF
request"
39. Altogcther. it is thought that the general
mandate, as formulated rn Article III of the
agreement on the IPTF, rs provrdmg sufficrent
opportunitrcs to help re-establish the rule of larv
m Bosnra It scems, horver,'er. that thc IPTF.
u'hich *'as created to rmplement the mandate. b1
no means has the staff and equrpmcnt to mect rts
obhgatrons. Almost a vear after rts officral
estabhshment. rt has onll'.;ust startsd to opcratc
at fulI strcngth and manl' of the tasks mcntroned
rn the mandate have not cvcn bccn consrdcrcd for
implemcntatron Whcncver therc is a real
problem. the IPTF nccds IFOR support and
mten'entlon
40 Grven that thc rntcrnatronal commurut1,.
and even more so thc Europcan Unron, has a
dtrect rntcrcst rn a pcaceful envrronment rn the
nervlr'-estabhshcd rndcpcndcnt states m former
Yugoslavia. rt should be more determmed rn rts
ambrtron to rc-estabhsh the rule of larv m Bosnia.
4l Obvrouslr'. rn the present post-conflrct
srtuatron in u'hrch feehngs of hate and rcr,engc do
not drsappcar overrught and u'herc thc nghts of
thc strongcst prevarl, thcrc rs a nccd for an
rnternatronallr'-run pubhc securrtv forcc Thrs
should be an armed bodl' u'rth a remrt to
maintarn lau' and ordcr. cnsure frccdom of
movement and assrst thc civrhan pohcc m other
aspects of lau' enforccmcnt, including arrcsts
42. Such a force should bc brggcr than the
present IPTF. consrst of u'ell-trarncd officers
rvho arc famrhar ruth all thc rssues mentroned m
Article IlI. paragraph 1, of thc prcscnt agreement
on the IPTF and uho sharc common values and a
common languagc as regards the rssues to be
addrcsscd. Thrs forcc should be adcquatell'
cqurpped to be able to rmplement its mandate
rvrthout the support or asslstance of an IFOR
successor forcc.
IV l|tar criminals
13 The search for and arrest of indrctcd uar
cnmrnals has been a particularh' sensrtrvc rssue
since IFOR began its opcratrons
44 It should be noted that. undcr tho Davton
Agreement. IFOR's tasks do not include setting
up search partres to look for indicted \\-ar
criminals. Accordrng to Article IX. paragraph g,
of Annex I -A to the Dalton Agreement,
responsrbilrtv for arrcstrng rndrcted uar criminals
lies urth thc thrcc srgnatorv parties to that
Agrecment. IFOR's task rs to apprehend indicted
war cnmlnals u'hcrc rt comes across them in the
coursc ofcarrfing out rts duties
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45. A NATO documcnt pubhshed on 14
February 1996. states
"Our pohcl' remarns that IFOR ii-rll dctarn
and transfer to the lntematronal Cnmrnal
Tnbunal for Former Yugoslaua (ICTY)
persons rndrcted for u'ar cnmes b1' the
Tnbunal u'hen rt comes rnto contact wrth
such pcrsons ur canling out its dutres The
ICTY rs proudrng HQ IFOR u'ith all
avarlable mformatron on the persons urdrcted
for u'ar crunes and ttus rnformation is berng
drstnbuted to IFOR personncl."
46 Although. on l6 February 1996. a
Memorandum of Understandrng betu'een NATO
and ICTY u'as concluded rn pnnciple uhrch
rncluded arrangcments for detamrng rndrcted u'ar
cnmmals rvho fall rnto the hands of the troops, rt
rvas not srgned untrl 9 Ma1' 1996 In fact. the
basic policv as defincd b1'the Dayton Agrccment
had not changed The MOU clearlv dcfines the
procedures now to be follou'ed rn such cases
41. All Bosnran authontres havc stresscd that
a ne\\' mandate for an IFOR successor force
should rnclude the task of searchmg for and
arrcstrng u'ar crrminals and bringing thcm to Thc
Hague for trral.
48 Dcsplte the fact that internatronal arrest
q'arrants hal'e bcen issued for certarn \\'ar
crimrnals- ln partrcular the Bosnian Serbs.
Radovan Karadzrc and Ratko Mladrc, IFOR ivrll
not mount spccrfic operations to arrest them An
internatronal arrcst \\'arrant places a legal
obhgatron on all states to arrcst the accused if
thel' enter the area of therr lunsdrction The
Contact Group has confirmed that responsibrlrtv
for arresting \\'ar crlmlnals and bnngrng them to
trial in The Hague rests x'ith the authonties rn
former Yugoslavial
49 Onlv recentlr'. the outgorng chref
prosecutor for the Internatronal Cnmrnal
Trrbunal for Former Yugoslavra. Rrchard
Goldstone, cntrcrsed the natrons most closelv
rnvolved rn setting up the Tribunal for therr
farlurc to arrest the most notonous war
criminals, and called it "pusillanimous"2.
l. Internattonal Herald Trtbune, 12 July 1996.
2 Internattonal Heralcl 'I'nbune, l9 September
1 996.
50. His successor, Mrs Loursc Arbour. has
appealed for a broader and more brndrng remlt
for thc arrest of war crlmlnals bv anv follou-up
force in Bosnta. statlng that NATO's restrrctrve
interpretation of IFOR tasks u'as partrcularll'
drsappointing
-51 A former chref prosecutor at Nuremberg
has rrghtlv sard that there can be no
rcconcrhation rn Bosnia unless rndrvidual gurlt
for thc appalhng cnmes commrtted durrng the
conflrct replaces the perruclous theorl' of
collectrve gurlt on u'hrch so much racial hatred
hangs3
52 It is knoun that rvar cnminals such as
Karadzic and Mladic are rvell protected bv
heavrlv armed bodyguards and that an1' operatron
to arrest them lrrll cost human hves. mcludrng
the lives of crvrhans u'ho mav be used as human
shrelds. Political authoritrcs also fcar crvrhan
unrest and retahatron bv former Bosnian Serb
troops against IFOR troops rf rmportant \l'ar
cnmmals are arrested and brought to tnal.
53 IFOR, and rts commander. have repeatedlv
declared that rt urll arrest the x'ar cnmmals by
anv mcans rf the polrtrcal leadership grves it thc
order to do soa
54 At present. rt seems unhkely that political
authonties u'rll instruct IFOR to search for and
arrest u'ar crrmrnals for fear of unpredictable
consequenccs. Under the Dalton Agreement. the
governments of the slgnatory states are to hand
over those rndrcted b1' thc Internatronal Crrmrnal
Trrbunal. If thel' refuse to do so. it rs for the
Contact Group to dccide u'hat measures to take.
including the rermposition of sanctrons
55. It does not seem rrght for the Bosnian
Government to point rts fingcr at IFOR for not
fulfilling x'hat are, in effect. the Government's
orvn obhgatrons.
V. Mine-clearing
56. The ternton of Bosnia is covered urth
mrncs At present. roughlv 50% of the estimated
14 500 mrnc ficlds have been identified and the
data fed mto a database Many fields have not
Internattonal Herald Trtbune, 23 May 1996
Internahonal Ilerald Tribune. S Julv 1996
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vet been found because battle hnes changed ven'
rapidlv durrng the conflict and also because
mines lvere often laid rn a haphazard na1' Under
the Dayton Agreement. mrne-cleanng rs thc
rcsponsrbrlrty' of the partres to the conflrct and
thev are indeed tryng to help idcntif;'the locatron
of mrne fields
57 Accordrng to estrmates b1' experts. there
are somc five to srx milhon mlnes ln Bosnia It
uill probabll' takc up to 30 \'ears to completc
minc clcarancc rn Bosnra Although clearance is
a task of the formcr \\'arnng factions, IFOR rs
prol'rdrng practrcal support b1' sharing mine
documentatron rnformatron, assisting civilian
agencres u'rth mrne a\\arcncss trarnrng and also
provrdrng them urth transport assrstance
rvhenever possrble.
58 Full-trmc mrne-clearrng has stopped for
drfferent reasons. Not onll' has dcmobrhsatron of
large numbers of the armed forces sapped the
human resources availablc for thrs actrvrtr'. but
the funds needed have also drred up On thc
othcr hand. rt should be noted that as far as
IFOR is concerned. there is no urgent need to
procecd because rt has non'met rts drsplacement
requrrements.
59 Although IFOR sill certamlv insrst on
mrne-clearrng rvhen there are overriding reasons
for it. rt takcs the vrov that rts authonty to do so
should onl1' be exercrsed sparrnglv in order to
keep rt credrble At IFOR. rt rs also noted that
makrng mrnc-cleanng compulson stronglr'
erodes the qualrtl' of thrs actrvrtv u'hereas onlv
100%o success ts acceptable.
60 IFOR rvrll, horvever, continue to refine its
database and share its informatron At thc same
time, rt urll deplov mmc-markrng packs and
supervlse the re-fencing ofcritical areas
W. Arms control agreement
6l In the Darton Agreement, rt n'as strpulated
that negotratrons on drsarmament in former
Yugoslavra should be completed b1' 6 June 1996
at the latest and rcsult rn a treatv reducrng the
srze of the armed forces and the number of healrr
\\'eapons
62 On 14 June 1996. thc representatives
Bosnra and Hcrzcgovma, thc Republic
of
of
Croatta, the Fcdcral Republic of Yugoslavra and
the tu'o Bosruan entities 
- 
the Fcderatron of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb Repubhc 
-
srgned an agreement on sub-rcgronal arms
control lvhich rvas negotiated under the ausprces
of the OSCE in Vienna The agrecment rncludcd
hmrtations for all partles tn the follourng
categones of hcaw, armaments battle tanks.
armoured combat vchrcles. aftrllen' over 75 mm.
combat aircraft and attack helicopters. For each
of the partles. cerhngs rvcrc set at the lowest
possrble lw'el. follourng the model of the Treaty
on the rcductron of Conventronal Forces in
Europe (CFE)
63 Thc arms ccrhngs agrccd are':
64 Under the agreement. starting from I July'
1996, thc partres have 16 months in uhrch to
reducc thc numbcr of u'eapons ther. hold to
specrfic levels Ercess \\'eapons can be exported,
destrol'ed. or put on fixcd pubhc drsplal, Excess
combat aircraft can be used for trainrng if they
are stnpped of armaments.
65 After the signrng of thc arrns control
agreement. the Unrted Nations Sccuntv Councrl
voted on l8 June 1996 to cnd formall1' thc arms
embargo on the states of former Yugoslavra. but
the European Union mamtained its existrng arms
embargo On 19 June, Operation Sharp Guard.
the lornt NATO-WEU naval blockade of former
Yugoslavra was suspended, but not formall1'
termrnated.
66 On 2 October 1996. NATO and WEU
announccd thc definitive end of Sharp Guard.
Dunng this operation, the naval units of both
organrsatrons stopped and questioned nearly'
74 000 ships. boarded almost 6 000 and sent
nearlv I .100 back to Itahan ports. At the same
time. WEU announced thc end of its Danube
Tanks Armourcd
combat
lc-tucles
Artrl-
lcry
Planus Heh-
coptsrs
FR\' I 025 850 3 750 155 53
Croatla 410 340 I 500 62 21
llosrua 410 340 1 500 62 2l
Scrb Rcp t37 113 500 21 1
!'cdcratron 273 227 I 000 .11 l4
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operatron. durrng u'hrch 6 748 lnspcctlons \\crc
carrrcd out- leadrng to thc drscovcn of 122
presumed vrolatrons of the embargo
67 Before thc end of 1996. artrllen'. combat
arrcraft and attack hchcoptcrs u'rll have to be
rcduccd bt' 40%' uhrlc baltlc tanks and armoured
combat r,ehrclcs u'rll havc to bc rcduccdbv 20o/"
68 Vcrrficatron of thc rmplementatron of the
arms control agrccment rs rn thc hands of the
OSCE. but IFOR provrdcs rnformatron on the
srzc ofand rcductrons rn the exrsting arsenals.
69 Thc rolc of IFOR rn thrs frameu'ork should
not bc underestrmated. srnce an important part of
lts contrnulng mrlrtan' tasks consrsts of
monrtorrng arrns and armed forccs IFOR
vcnfics barracks and cantonmcnts at a total of
700 srtes. u'hile it also contrnuouslv rnspccts
arrns storage sltes In an)' avcragc IFOR
brrgade. one companv has a full-trmc.1ob rn arms
control.
l0 It should also be rcmcmbcrcd that IFOR.
lrrth rts robust and modern armourcd equlpment.
can corrrmand respcct and as a consequence can
more easrh' cnforcc vcrrficatron and rnspcctrons
if nccd bc Thc prcscncc of a foreign mrlrtarl'
forcc rs ccrtarnlr. prol'rdrng leverage Wrthout it.
rmplementatron of thc agrced arms reductron
rcglmc. uhrch rs considered important for
rcgronal stabrlrtr'. u'ould be undermined.
7l Thc NATO Permanent Council's decisron.
on 2 Octobcr 1996. that IFOR u'rll proudc
addrtronal support to the OSCE for tasks rclatcd
to thc rmplcmentatron of the arrns control
agrccmcnt. rs therefore to be rvelcomcd IFOR
urll provrdc the OSCE u'rth rnformatron on
cxrstmg \\'eapons. ensurc thc transport of anv
\\'eapons rn excess of the ccrhngs cstabhshcd b1'
the agreement and provrde englnccnng support
for the destruction of such surplus \\'eapons
WI. The Wenna Agreemenl on confidence-
building measures
12 On 2 February 1996. an initial agreement
u'as concludcd bctu.een the partics to the Bosruan
conflrct as forcsccn rn the Darton Agreement and
ncgotratcd under the ausplces of OSCE. The
agrccmcnt rnvolr es 16 rndrvidual confidencc-
burldrng measures rncludrng
exchange of mrlrtarl' mformatron.
constramts on ccrtarn mrlrtan' actlvltros.
ruthdrau al of hcarl' \\ capons.
- 
rdcntrfication of armamcnts plants.
- 
mrlrtrn coopcrahon prograrnmes.
estabhshment of mrlrtan, haison mrssions.
- 
commrtmonts to thc non-prohfcratron of
\\capons of mass dcstruction
73 Practrcc rnspections based on thc Vrcnna
Agrccmcnt hal'e alreadv taken place but, as urth
the arms control agreement. lt ls ven' hkelv that
thc prescnce of IFOR rs provrdrng lcr,'cragc and rs
an rnccntrve for the srgnatoncs to comph' urth
thc agrcement.
WII. Rearmament of the ormedforces of the
Muslim-Crout Federution in Bosnia
(equip und train)
74 Fulll' rn hnc u'rth rts carhcr pohcv and not
connected u'rth thc Davton Agrccment. the
Unrted Statcs has takcn the irutratrve of
equlpprng and trarnrng the armed forces of the
Mushm-Croat Foderatron of Bosrua. The
oblcctrl'c rs to brrng the Federation's arsenal up
to thc samc level as that of the Serb Republrc
urth a vrcrv to IFOR's urthdrau'al at the end of
t996
15 The programme should result rn an
adcquatelv srzed. hrgh-qualrtr'. u'ell-trarncd and
s'ell-equipped force. not for the purposc of bcrng
aggresslvc. but of scndrng "an unmrstakable
message of dctcrrcncc to an)' potentral
aggressor"6 It is sard that thrs programme also
has a sccondan' goal of drmrnrshrng the
contmumg rnfluencc of lran on Bosnra's armr'
and securrtv scn'lces
76 The Unrtcd Statcs argues that nerther
entrtv should bc ucak to thc pornt of not havmg a
dcterrent forco ln thc cvent of hostilrties
resumlng It also takes the vreu, that thc arms
control agrccmcnt rs not enough to create the
l0
6 ..ltlanttc \err'.s. 8 August 1996
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ncccssan' balance. Thc Urutcd States had offered
$100 mrlhon of the $ti00 mrlhon it estunatcd riould
be nr"rcded for an "aid and equrp" prografirme
77 At thcrr meetmg m Palcrmo on 9 and l0
March 1996. several European Uruon Forcrgn
Minrstcrs crpresscd scnous rcscn'atrons about thc
rcarmamcnt mrtratrve.
78. Nohuthstandrng opposltlon from rts
Europcan alhcs. thc Uruted States pursued rts plan
to re-arm thc armv of thc Mushm-Croat Federatron
m Bosrua and on 15 March 1996. thc Conforcnce
on the rearmamcnt of thc Mushm-Croat Fcderatron
of Bosrua u'as opcncd m Ankara at thc ultratrl'e of
thc Uruted States The Europcur Umon u.as
rcprcscntcd onlv bv obscn'crs from 9 of rts mcmber
statcs. urth 1l Muslm countnes partlclpatmg
79 At the confercncc. thc Umtt"d Statcs dd not
obtarn thc commrtmcnt of the arurounccd $800
mrlhon for its "equip and train" programme Onll'
Turkcy'promised $2 mrlhon fundrng for traurrng thc
Fedcration's officers. uhrlc thc Europcan Uruon
refused to partlcrpate. savmg that rt gave pnonh'to
crlrl rcconstructron
80. Undcr strong pressurc from the Urutcd
States. Mushm and Croat officrals also agreed on
the tert of a natronal defencc lau. adopted b1' thc
Fcdcratron's Parhamcnt on 9 Jul1 1996 It provrdes
for the rntcgratron of thc Bosruan arrn\. uhich is to
conslst of both Bosruan Croats and Mushms
Accordrng to thc dcfcnce lau'. mtcgratron of the
Mushm and Croat forccs should be aclxer.ed m
thrcc 1'oars. Thc futr.rrc lornt armcd forccs are
cxpectcd to havc 5-5 000 troops. of uhrch 40 000
uill be Mushm and I5 000 Croat
8l Thc Deputl' Dcfcnce Mrmster of the
Fcdcratron of Bosrua and Herzegovura. Hasan
GcnEc. \\'as confidcnt that thc mtegratlon of
Mushm and Croat forccs u'ould succeed bccause
both partrcs have an rntcrcst rr the equrp and train
programmc Thc orgamsatronal structure of thc
nerv armcd forccs urll be bascd on examples rr thc
West. urcludrng arrangemcnts for democratrc
polrtrcal control. In the futurc. thc armed forces rull
be largell'profcssronal combrnod urth some degrec
ofconscnptron
82 Mr Vladrmrr Sollrc. the Defencc Mulster of
the Federation. sa\\ posrtrve aspccts rn thc equrp and
traur programmc. Hc u'as rn favour of the
European Uruon approach to hal'c the lou'est
possrblc level of amrs rn the region of former
Yugoslaua but he argucd that at the moment. the
US pohct'\\'as more rcalstrc The Fedcratron had
to acqurrc arms in order to bc able to protcct rtsclf
agarnst thc Serbs. uho u'crc still far too hcavrll'
armed As rcgards the rntcgratron of the armcd
forces of Croats and Mushms rn the Federatron. hc
thought thcrc mrght bc budgct problems for
managmg thesc forccs. It uould not be possrblc to
have a cornmoll mrlrtan'doctrmc bccause he could
not rmagrne that the Croats rn thc Fcderatron uould
take up arms rf the Fcderatron \\'erc attacked b1' the
Rcpubhc of Croatra
83 For the Urutcd Strtes. the mcrgcr of the tn'o
arrnrcs lnto one forcc u'as a condrtron for thc start of
thc cqurp and tram prograrnmc
84 Apart from thc Urutcd States' contnbutron.
fundrng for u'eapon acqulsltlon has come pnmanlv
from Sar.rd Arabra- Kuuart. the Uruted Arab
Emrratcs and Malal'sra Apart from thc $100
mrlhon rn cquipmcnt ri'llch thc Unrted Statcs rs
contributrng. a total amount of $140 mrlhon has
been pledgcd bv other statcs
85 Thc soldrers of thg armv of the Mushm-
Croat Fedcratron rrrll be traurcd b1 Mrlrtan'
Professronal Rcsources lncorporatcd. a pnvatc
orgamsatron of rctrrcd US mrlrtan'officers
It6 Poland has mcanululc rcsrstcd the United
States' requcst to scll -15 Polish-made T-72 Lrnks to
Bosrua. argumg that it sturds b1' thc dccrsron of the
Europcans not to arm anv srde m anr'r.ar''
81 Thc Umtcd Statcs has promrsed to proude.
among other thrngs. .l-5 M-60 tanks. 15 UH-l
hehcoptcrs. M-16 nfles and ammunitions Thc first
US arms sllpment amved on 29 August 1996
88. In Junc 1996. Turkel'. urth the support of the
Uruted Statcs. startcd a programme to tram Bosman
soldrcrs
89 It has bccn nghtll'argucd bl' onc cntrce that
ufule the arm of the Dayton Agrccmcnt is to crcatc
a multr-cthnic natron. thc cqurp-and-tram
prograrnme almost seems dcsrgncd to nulhfi' rt.
J Internatrt>nal ilerold Trtbune..l Scptcmbcr 1996
8 F rnancral Ttna.s and ltternatrottol [{erald
'l nbutte. -1 Juli' 1996
9 Frcdcrrck Bonnart rn the Intentaltottol flarolcl
'l rtbune. l2 Scptcmbcr 1996
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Opponents of a mulu-ethruc natton u-rll consrder it
to be greater lusttficatton of therr dnvc for
rndependence and el'cntual absorpilon of therr
nerghbours
90 At thc same ttme. it ma1' rvell create
circumstances ln u'hrch thc long-standing
prcsence of forcrgn troops u'ould be required to
prevent anv attempt to tnsttgate a neu' tnter-
ethnrc shou'dou'n Instead of supplving ne\\'
\\'eapons. the marn effort nou' should be drrected
at achrel'rng an even balance by reducing arms
all round
IX. IFOR support for the Uniled liutions
Tra n sitional Administrution in eostern
Slovonia (UNTAES)
9l On 15 Januan' 1996. the United Natrons
Sccuntl' Councrl adopted Resolutton 1037.
cstablishing the Unrted Nattons Transitronal
Admrnrstratlon rn eastem Slavonra (LfNTAES).
w'hrch should cnablc thrs regton to bc pcacefullv
rerntegratcd rn Croatra
92 A fcu' u'ccks later. on 6 February 1996.
thc Belgian Govemment agrecd to take over thc
command of thc United Natrons peacekeeping
operatlon ln eastern Slavonra. settmg thrce
condrtrons for rts presence a clcar mandatc.
NATO mrlrtan' support vra IFOR and thc
guarantcc of the engagemcnt of "credible" Unrted
Natrons troops.
93 Bv mid-May 1996, UNTAES u.as almost
complctelr- m place Out of a total of 5 467
pcrsons. there n'ere about 100 UN mrlitary
obsen'ers (I-NMO). 254 civilian poltccmen and
300 emplovees Thc forcc rs led b1' a Belgran
Malor-General. Joscf Schoups. and rs made up of
contmgents from the follourng countnes
Belgrum 
- 
870 mcn (about 200 of u'hom are staff
officers). includrng a mechanrsed infantrl'
battahon (Belbat) of 625 Blue Bcrcts. Russra 
-
an mfantn' battahon of 949 mcn (Rusbat).
Jordan 
- 
a battalion of 860 men (Jorbat).
Pakistan 
- 
an infantrl' battahon of 978 Bluc
Berets (Pakbat); Slovak Repubhc an
engmecnng battalion of 588 men: Czech
Repubhc 
- 
a medical unrt of 39 persons; Ukrarne
- 
a heavl'tank squadron rvrth 160 mcn. a
squadron of ten antr-tank hehcopters urth 124
men and a squadron of srx transport plancs u'rth
150 mcn (or 434 rn all). Indonesra 
- 
a medrcal
compan\' (IndoMedCor'). Argenttna a
rcconnarssance squadron u'rth 75 men The
Unitcd States has drspatched some mrlrtan'
personnel. who arc attached to thc scrvrcc of the
UN admmistrator. thc US drplomat Jacques
Klern
94. NATO's Pcrmanent Councrl decrded in
January I996 to assrst the peacckeeptng force in
eastcrn Slavonta u'ith close alr support rf
requcstcd and rvtth the provtston of ard for a
possrblc cmcrgencv urthdrau'al. \rere the
srtuatron to dcterrorate. Thcsc tasks uere to be
implemcnted b1'IFOR. and stncc then. the North
Atlantrc Councrl has rerterated thrs commrtment
95 Demilitansatron of eastern Slavonra
formalll' started on 2l Mar', although tt u'as
alreadv largelv under u'av before that datc. In
fact. 85o/o of the hean' \\'eapons hcld bv the
seccssionrst Serbs had left the reglon pnor to the
officral start of demrlttartsatton On 3 Juh' 1996.
the Secuntv Councrl declared that
dcmrlrtarrsatron had been accomphshed
succcssfulll'
96. Othcr problcms remarn to bc solved such
as the retum of Croat refugees to therr orrn
reglon rn u'hrch Serbs, u'ho have alrvavs ltved
there. ri'rll also ursh to remaln Neu' ethntc
tenslons cannot be excludcd. Furthermorc.
eastern Slavonra rs facrng problems simrlar to
those rn Bosnra. such as massrve destructron of
houses and rnfrastructurc. numcrous mrne fields
still to bc cleared and a r,'er1'hrgh unemplovment
ratc
91 Officralll', the LNTAES mandate rs due to
cnd on 15 Januan' l99l. u'ith a possrblc
cxtcnsron of a maxrmum of one vear Croats
u'ould agree to an cxtenslon of thrcc months,
ri'hrle Serbs u'ould hkc to have thc mandate
crtcnded bv at least onc vear. The peacekeeprng
force rs most hkcll' to stav untrl Jul1' 1997 at
lcast
X. Return of refugees and displaced persons
98 Under the Davton Agreement, all refugees
and displaced persons have the rrght to return to
therr homcs People should be allorved to move
freell'throughout Bosnra and the human rights of
everl' Bosnran cltlzen should be monitored bi' an
indcpcndcnt commrssion and an mtematronallv-
trarned crvrlian pohce force
t2
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99 As a result of the conflrct ii'hrch has raged
for four vears. over half of thc 4 4 mrlhon people
formmg the pre-rvar populatron of Bosnra havc
bccome rcfugees or drsplaced persons. The
return and rcsettlemcnt of so manv people has
onlv just started and rt rvrll by no mcans be easl,.
consrdenng thc massrvc destructron of houses.
factones and basrc infrastructure. thc number of
mrnc fields strll to be cleared and the verl' hrgh
ratc of unemplol'ment m afflicted arcas Thrs
process u'ill take man)' \,ears. leavrng asrde the
questron of n'hether rt urll el'er be fulh'
accomphshed Untrl nou'. feu'er than 100 000
out of a total of 2.4 mrllion refugces have
returncd to their homes
100 Freedom of movemcnt rs a prehminan'
condrtron for the rcturn and resettlement of
refugecs and displaced persons, Although
intematronal organrsations and IFOR too have
made manv efforts to promotc freedom of
movement. thrs has not vet been accomphshed
At the elections of l.l September 1996 for
instance. onll' 13 500 of the expccted 100 000
refugees cast therr votes in therr former areas of
rcsrdencelo.
l0l In thc Darton Agreement. responsibrlrtv
for frcedom of movement was asslgncd to the
srgnaton' partrcs.
102 Hori-ever. accordrng to Article VI.
paragraph 3. of Annex l-A to the Darton
Agrecmcnt "IFOR shall havc the rrght to fulfill
rts supporting tasks rvithrn thc hmrts of its
assrgned princrpal tasks and avarlable resources,
and on request to observe and prel'ent
mterference lvrth the movement of crvrhan
populatrons, refugees. and drsplaced persons, and
to respond approprrately to dehberate violcncc to
hfc and person "
103. Expenence has also demonstrated that the
darh' presence of s'cll-organiscd and neutral
forcrgn forces can create a safe envrronment and
gradually promote trust and confidcnce betx'een
the vanous ethnic commuruties u'hich, rn the
longcr term, lvrll help to bnng about frccdom of
movcment and, ultimately. rcturn and
resettlcment It rs obvious that thrs process
cannot stop on 20 December 1996.
XI. Changes in the implementution
of IFOR's mandate
104 From the start of opcratron "Jornt
Endcavour". both IFOR and NATO have been
stressmg the rmportancc of implementing therr
tasks as mandated by the Dalton Agreemcnt
IFOR ri'as not supposed to becomc a pohce forcc
or bodl'guard There xas an almost paranord
fear of "missron creep", an extensron of tasks
be1'ond the orrgrnal mandatc
105 At the ver)' start of rts operations. IFOR
trred to concentratc on rts main task of ensuring
observance of the mihtarl' pro\'lslons of the
Dayton Agreement. rvhich consrsted m partrcular
in:
cnsuring the separalon of the uamng
partres and respect for the separation
zones.
checkrng that heall weapons remaur out
of these areas
106 As a consequence. horvever. of rncreased
actruty' b1' the ICTY to collect evrdence for the
indtctment for uar crimmals. there u'as an urgent
need for IFOR support and protectron On 14
February' 1996 thcrefore, a NATO document u'as
pubhshed settrng out rules for "IFOR assrstance
to thc Intcrnational Tnbunal" This document
stated the posrtron of IFOR as follou's:
- 
"IFOR's mam contnbution s to provide a
secure enuronment, in ufuch other
organisatrons 
- 
such as the ICTY 
- 
can
carr_v out thcrr missron urumpeded.
- 
our pohcl- remarns that IFOR will dctarr
and transfer to the ICTY persons rndrcted
for u'ar crimes b1'the Tnbunal u'hen rt
comcs rrto contact uith such persons in
carrvmg out therr duties Thc ICTY is
provrdrng HQ IFOR uith all avarlable
informatron on the persons rrdrcted for
\\ar crunes and thrs rnformation rs berng
drstnbuted to IFOR personnel.
- 
IFOR wrll also pror,rde logrstrcal suppoft
to the ICTY case-b\-case on request, to
the extent that IFOR's primary dutres and
avarlable resources perrrut As an
illustratron of such support, NATO
responded positrvelv to an ICTY rcquest10 i'R(--llandelsblad. l7 September 1996
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to assrst m the sccure transport of hvo
pcrsons detarned as suspects and potentral
uitresscs from Sara.;evo to The Hague on
12 February for further rnvestrgation br'
thc Tnbunal.
- 
NATO mrlrtary authontres and the ICTY
are contrnuurg to refinc thc arrangemcnts
for IFOR's cooperafion u'rth the Tnbunal.
Gn'cn the confidentralrtv of ICTY's uork.
IFOR and thc Tnbunal urll not rclcase
informatron on Tnbunal requests to IFOR
to assist in specrfic cases.
the IFOR commanders urll do therr
utrnost urthm therr capabrhilcs to assrst
the ICTY m rts uork "
107 In March 1996. thc NATO Pcrmanent
Councrl adoptcd polrtrcal gurdelures for SACELR
regardrng IFOR assrstancc to the crr,'rlian sector.
Thc Councrl statcd that decrsrons on rcquests for ard
from ciuhan orgamsatrons and thc Unrted Natrons
Hrgh Representatlve u'ould be takcn on a case-b1.
case basrs, accordrng to availabrhh' cntena. Such
rcquests u'ould specrficalll bc armcd at
the reburldrng of ciulian socrctl' m
Bosrua:
the protectron of evrdcnce m and arou.nd
mass graves.
- 
ard to rcfugccs.
- 
ard to ICTY officrals and to the
Intematronal Pohcc Task Force (IPTF)
108 On 13 March. the UN Fhgh Rcpresentatrvc.
Carl Brldt. called on the Alhance to provrde morc
support. notabll' morc transport. better secunh'.
morc tclephones. and askcd rt to take more of a lcad
m engmecnng prolects Furthermorc. he rcquestcd
support for thc orgarxsatron of electrons rn Bosma
Tlus last rcquest m partrcular rvas to causc
problems for IFOR's cxlt stratcg)' u'tuch, at that
trme. u'as planned to start durLng the summer m
order to make sure that all troops could leave before
the end of 1996.
109 Nw'crtheless. Mr Bildt's rcquests u'crc mct in
principle by'NATO placrng at lls drsposal
- 
means of transport, especralll' planes and
hehcopters;
commurucatrons cquipment, mcluding a
satellrtc commurucatrons statron
I I 0 At the end of March 1996, Gcncral Joulu'an.
SACEITR- declared that IFOR u'ould proudc
consrderable support for thc crvrlnn rcconstructlon
cndcavour. focusrng rts cfforts on rcparnng roads
and bndges and on mrnc-clearurg m order to hclp
rcstore ficcdom of movemcnt urthm Bosrua and at
its borders. a utal condrtron for thc holdrng of
electrons, The US Dcfcnce Secrctan'. Wrlham
Pern'. derucd that IFOR u'as erlendmg its role srnce
mlsslons to support cruhan reconstruction \\cre
pronded for bv the pcacc agreemcnt on Bosnra and
Herzegovura
I l1 Latcr. IFOR Commandcr Admrral Lcrghton-
Smrth suggested makrng IFOR more mobrle and
remforcrng the proccss bv mcans of hehcopters and
morc mrlrtan'pohcc"
ll2 The North Atlantrc Councrl. mcctmg rn rts
Defonce l\{mrstcrs' session on 13 Junc rn Brussels.
confrrmed thc pnmc rmportance of IFOR's mrlrtary
mlssron but at the samc tlmc rccognrscd the stuft of
emphasrs ri'hrch had occurrcd rn the rmplementatlon
of IFOR's tasks [n therr commuruquc. the mrrustcrs
stated
"We noted mth satnfactton that IFOR rs
provrdrng mcrcaslng support for the cnrl
aspccts of the Peace Agrccment s-rthm the
hmrts of rts rcsources and of the demands of
rts pnman' mrssron, m such areas as the
conduct of clccfions- thc rctum of rcfllgees
and drsplaccd pcrsons. and the marntenance
of lau' and order Bv conturuing to ensure a
sccure environment and promotc ficcdom of
movement. IFOR urll also makc an
rmportant contnbutron to crcaturg thc
condrtrons for ficc and farr elcctrons Wc
urll also contrnue to support thc uork of thc
lntemattonal Cnmrnal Tnbunal for formcr
Yugoslana The apprehendrng of u'ar
cnmrnals and the nvestrgatron of u'ar cnmcs
are esscntral to bnng lustrcc and durablc
peace to Bosma urd Herzegovrna."
I l3 In Scptcmber 1996. the F[gh Representatrve.
Carl Bildt. asked for IFOR's assrstance m settmg up
mstrtutrons after the I.l Septembcr electrons The
NATO Permanent Councrl agrced to tlus ln
l-r
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pnnciple but requested NATO's mrlrtary authontres
to studl thc possrbrlrtrcs of assistrng the civrl sector
m Bosrua u'lule askrng Mr Bildt uhat hpe of
asslstancc hc u'anted before taktng a final decrsron
The Permancnt Councrl also rvantcd to be ablc to
dctcrmrne rihethcr these rcquests u'ould be m lmc
ri'rth IFOR's mlsslon.
I l4 It should. hox'evcr, be notcd that thc
mrhtan' tasks berng carncd out b1' IFOR strll
form the bulk of the u-orkload. as can easrlv bc
concluded after a closer look at thc follosrng
tnvcnton',
monitor comphancc along I 075
krlometres of the rntcr-ethnic boundan
hnc (IEBL) and on the 4 300 square
kilometres of the zone of scparatlon
(zoS),
- 
contrnue to vcnfi' faction barrack I
cantonments (over 700 sites).
- 
urspcct AD storage srtes,
ensure freedom of movement.
- 
morutor mrne clcarance-
- 
conturue jorrt mrlrtary commrssion I
milrtary commissrons / hatson uork,
- 
sun,erllance tasks (urcludrng ICTY
rnvestigatron sites).
- 
marntam 5 000 km of corps / dnrsion
desrgnated routes;
sccunh'of bndge srtes.
- 
secunq'of routes I traffrc control.
mamtam qurck reaction forccs,
- 
protcct bascs:
sustam the forcc.
- 
support clections and cnrl agencics.
XII. Towards a post-IFOR
ll5. As a consequencc of the slouncss u'ith
rvhtch crvrl structurcs \\'erc bcrng set up and
hostilitl betu'een the cthnrc groups, u'hrch u,as
far greatcr than prc&ctcd. experts and polrtrcrans
started. earlv rn 1996. to consrder and discuss the
possrbilrtv of extendrng the peacc mlssron ln
Bosnia
I 16 In thrs contcxt. rt rs also u'orth mcntrorung
that accordrng to Michacl Stciner. Dcputv Hrgh
Represcntatrve ln Bosnra. a succcssor force to
IFOR rs requrrcd rn order to provide Bosnia rrrth
the brcathrng spacc rt necds Thts forcc should
stal,at lcast untrl the nert elcctrons. to bc held in
1998. and should halc a mandatc srmrlar to the
present IFOR mandate
lll Mr Stcmer strcssed that the results of the
l.l Septcmbcr electrons u'ould have been far less
nattonahstrc rf voters had knou'n that a masslve
presencc of foreign troops aftcr 20 Decembcr
1996 u'as guaranteed Pcople cast therr I'otcs for
natronahst lcaders bccause thel' lvanted to be
surc of berng protectcd rn the cvcnt of a fresh
outbrcak of hostllrtrcs after thc announccd
dcparture of IFOR
I l8 All thc politrcal and militarl
representatil'es of the Bosnran authorrtrcs s-hom
1'our Rapportcur met dunng hrs reccnt vrsit to
Bosnra and Hcrzcgovlna agrccd that there w'rll
havc to bc a mrlrtan' succcssor forcc prcsent on
Bosnran terrrton' if IFOR ls golng to pull out as
planned
(a) T'he opinion of the European governments
I19. On thc frrnge of the WEU extraordrnan'
scsslon hcld rn London on22-23 Februan' 1996,
Prime Mrnrstcr John Ma;or expressed doubts
about the lcngth of the IFOR mrssion bcing
sufficrent and suggested that alternatlve soluttons
should be considercd.
120 In fact. the Forergn and Dcfcncc Ministcrs
of WEU member statcs can be quotcd as havrng
sard that IFOR urll have to b0 folloued up bv a
succcssor forcc rf Europc and rts alhes uant to
make sure that Bosnia is not plunged rnto \\'ar
agaln
l2l. [t uas therefore onlv logrcal that the
Forergn Mrnrstcrs of thc European Unron.
meetmg rn Tralcc. Ircland. on 9-10 Septembcr
1996. declared that ther'\\'erc ln favour of
European Unron rnvol'n'ement tn a stabrlrsation
t5
DOCUMENT I51I
plan for Bosnia u'hich should last for about tuo
\ICATS
122. A rcmarkable positive change rs
observable ln the attttudc of the German
Governmcnt. rvhrch unttl no\\. has onlv
participated urth medrcal. engrneenng and logistical
uruts
123. Vrsrtrng Saralevo on 18 Scptcmber 1996. the
Gcrman Defence Mtmster. Volker Ruhe. made rt
clear that Germanr' $'ants to partrcrpate full1' rn the
post-IFOR force and that rt rs prepared to send
urfantry uruts urth armoured vehrcles urto Bosrua
It secms hkell'that thcl' u'ould be part of Eurocorps
uruts scnt to Bosrua. u-hich u'ould be the first
mstance of therr opcrational deplolmentl2
124 At Bergcn. on 26 September 1996, the
Russran Defencc Mtruster. Igor Rodronov, declared
that Russia u'as m favour of contrnurng tts
cooperatron urth NATO m Bosrua because further
bloodshed had to be avordcd.
(b) The opinion of the United States
125 The Uruted States has for a long trme
maintained rts positron that no changes should be
made to the final date for the urthdraq'al of IFOR
Reflectrng the US posttton. General Joulu'an stated
rn March 1996 that thc debate on a postJFOR
mrlitary presence could sap the current mrsston of
rts sensc of urgencl' and that much of the
momcntum for peacc u'ould drl'up.
126. Accordrng to numy obsen'ers- tlus
entrenched position is mamlv a consequcnce of thc
domestrc polrtrcal situatton rn the Umted States.
Presrdent Chnton. urestlug uith an unuillurg
Congress, could onlv secure approval for sendrng
US ground troops to Bosrua sublect to a firm
pronuse that the GIs uould come back home urthrt
a year. i.e. bcfore Chnstmas 1996.
121. Before learrng for the rnformal NATO
Dcfence Mrusters' mcctrng in Bergen, rn late
September 1996, the US Defcnce Secretary,
Wilham Perrl', told the Senate's Armed Forces
Comnuttee that retention of a multrnational force m
Bosrua rrught not be necessary He also sard that,
accordrng to tus analvsrc. a rcsumption of hostrlrtres
12. Frankfurter -4llgemeine Zettung, l9 September
1996 and Atlanttc \tev,s.20 September 1996
could be preventcd b1' the air force, urthout
necessanlv deployng troops on the ground
128 After the meetmg m Bergen. houever. Mr
Penl' recogrused that support for thc rmportant
aspects of the Dalton Agreement. such as freedom
of movement. *'ould requlrc a substanttal ground
troop presencc He mamtarned that, according to
the Uruted States. no ground troops rvould be
nccded for dcterrence.
129 Later. Undersecretary of State John
Komblum confirmed thc US Gol'cmment's posttton
that rt is urlhng to constder partrcrpatrng m a post-
IFOR force if thc NATO studl' beurg done
demonstratcs that rts partrcipation ls appropnate
and necessan'".
130 Meanuhrle. the Uruted States rs contmumg
its masquerade to prepare for the xithdrau'al of all
its troops from Bosnra accordrng to thc ongrnal
mandate At the trme of u-ntmg thrs report (earl1'
October 1996), about 5 000 US soldrers are berng
sent to Bosrua m order to prepare for and oversee
the rrrthdraival of IFOR This ncu' contrngent.
commg from thc lst Infantry dmston based rn
Germanl'. rs to complete its mrssion rn the course of
March 1997
l3l The Uruted States urll most probabll'
participatc rn a post-IFOR force. even uith ground
troops, partlv because tts mtemational prcstige
rvould bc at stakc rf it allou'ed the Darton
Agreement to collapsc but also 
- 
and thrs mav be
the most mpofiant considcratron 
- 
to sccure the
futurc of NATO and tts oun leadrng posrtion rn that
organisatron.
132 Europeans should bear m mmd. hou'ever.
that rn the not too dlstant future thel' u'rll havc to
face ther oun responstbtlrtres for securitr, tn
European temtory It should also be noted that
refusal to acccpt long-term responsibrlrty rs a
fundamental premrse of US poho' on formcr
Yugoslar.ra
(c) The thernatives
133 ln the recent past- vanous suggestions have
been made for solutrons other than sendrng a post-
IFOR forcc ncludrng Amencan ground troops to
Bosnia
l6
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134 The most frequently' heard idea rs that
Europcans should estabhsh a smaller force.
probabll, u'rthout US ground troops, but
supported by, assets regarding n'hrch the United
States has a predomrnant role, such as
rntelhgence, air surverllance and logistrcs. This.
rt rs suggested. could be an opportunrty for a
WEU-lcd forcc or a CJTF operatron
135. European govemments have categoricalll'
rejected thrs suggestron Thel' recall the
LINPROFOR situatron u'here the Unrted States
had no ground troops rn Bosnia and u'here
European troops had to pa)' the pnce of
retahatron bv u'arnng factions for US air stnkes
Europeans have learnt thc lesson that unless all
the countnes rnvolved in peacekeeprng have
troops on the ground. they take verl' drfferent
vieu's of u'hat can and should be done to kecp the
peace
136 Moreover. rt should be noted that although
a start lvas madc m Berlm on u'orkmg out the
combined joint task forces (CJTF) conccpt, manl'
dctarls are strll under drscussion and more trme rs
needed to implement rt fully Drscussrons on
NATO's new corrunand structures, u'hrch are
closelv cormected rvrth the CJTF concept and
also wrth the Europeanisatron of NATO, have
not ),et bcen concludcd erther. Moreovcr,
NATO's Secretary'-General. Javier Solana, has
rrghtll' stated that the new NATO militarl'
structure nou' bemg developed, includrng CJTF,
cannot bc uscd rn the absence of European
unrtyla.
137. As regards the question of u'hether the
Europeans rvould be able to assume therr
responsibrlrties rn a purely, European mrlrtarv
operation after the end of the IFOR mrssion in
December 1996. there rs lrttle cause for
optrmrsm At the intcrgovernmcntal conference
revierung the Maastricht Trcaty, no progress has
been made on creating a frameu'ork for the
development of a European forergn and securitv
pohcy. A common European defence poho',
x'hrch should be consrdered a logical
consequence of the common foreign and secuntv
pohcr,'. is therefore still an oblective for the future
rather than a tangible realitl'
138. It has also been suggested that the OSCE
should be givcn a more rmportant role, rncludrng
the establishment of a lasting peace in Bosnia.
Indeed, thc arms control agrecment and the
Vrenna Agreement on confidence-buildrng
measures, both concludcd under thc auspices of
the OSCE 
- 
u'hich rs also responsrble for
superusmg therr rmplementatron 
- 
are rmportant
instruments for achreving mcreased transparencv
m securitl' matters and could foster a stable
regronal balance *'hrch is vital for a permanent
polrtrcal scttlement
139. It should be noted. hou'ever. that the
OSCE lacks the operational capabrlities and
strong unified structure that are rndrspensable for
an authontativc role in the sort of sustarned
operatlon requrred in Bosnra Moreover, rt is
common knolrledge that until norv all rrutratn'es
and proposals to remforce the OSCE have been
torpedoed by various coalitions of natronal
delegations
(d) NATO activities
140. At therr meetmg on 13 June 1996. NATO
Dcfence Mrnisters agreed to conduct an urgent
revre\\' of future military options m former
Yugoslavra immedratelv after the 14 Septembcr
elcctions rn Bosnra At the same tlme, the US
Defcnce Secrctarv. Wrlham Perry. ofFered to
recommit US forces n 1997 rf NATO decrded
that a fresh mlsslon rn Bosnra rvas needed.
l4l. At the beginnrng of August 1996, the
North Atlantic Councrl and SACEUR desrgnated
Headquarters Alhed Land Forces Central Europe
(HQ LANDCENT) as the nucleus of a nerv
hcadquarters to assume command and control of
operation "Joint Endeavour" HQ LANDCENT
u'rll deplol' forces and takc on missrons and
commitments of both IFOR headquarters, as
thcatre hcadquartcrs. and ARRC headquarters as
thc land component When it u'as desrgnatcd,
HQ LANDCENT was supposed to assume
responsibilitl' for organisrng the IFOR
u'rthdrarval, but it rs now supposed to become the
headquarters of the IFOR successor forcc. most
likcly'lvrth thc currcnt LANDCENT commander,
the US General Wilham Crouch. as rts
commandcr, one British and one French deputy
commandcr and a German chief-of-staff
142 Meetrng rnformally rn Bergen (Noru'a1').
on 25-26 September 1996. NATO Defence
Mrnisters noted unanimouslv that it was
t7
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undoubtcdl). nccessan' to creatc a post-IFOR
forcc m Bosnra u'ith a nerr mandate. and pohcv
gurdchncs u'crc bcrng draun up ln ordcr to
cnable thc competent mrlrtan authorrtrcs at
SACEUR to start contingeno' plannrng.
1.+3 Follourng an agrocment bet*'cen NATO
Dcfencc Minrstcrs rn Bergcn. on 2 Octobcr 1996.
NATO's Permanent Councrl decrdcd that IFOR
riould remaln at full capacltv untrl after the
munrcrpal elcctrons Earher. rt had alreadv bccn
dccrded that IFOR n'ould support the OSCE rn
prepanng for the munrcrpal electrons. provrded
these took place bcfore the end of rts mandate
l.l4 Thc munrcrpal clectrons. uhrch arc no\\
schcdulcd for 24 Novcmbcr 1996. rirll rcqurrc a
hugc mrlrtan' cffort to protcct voters uho rnsrst
on votmg rn thc touns from u'hrch ther u'crc
cxpclled
XIII. Post-IFOR tasks
145 Accordrng to NATO Sccretan'-Gcneral.
Javrer Solana. thc ob.lectn'e of a NATO post-
IFOR forcc should bc to assrst progrcss tou'ards
stabrlrtl' rn thc rcgron and providc an cnvrronmcnt
of securrtv u'hile permanent lnstltutlons are
estabhshed and thc partres fullv assumc thcir
rcsponsrbrlitrcs German Defence Mmrstcr.
Volker Ruhc. hopcd that thc post-IFOR force
rvould recelvc a mandatc to pursue. and not onlr'
to dctarn. u'ar crrmlnals In his vierr. an
rnternatronal peacckecprng force cannot cohabrt
urth u'ar crrmrnals
146 Bosnran authontrcs havc madc it clcar to
vour Rapporteur that an IFOR succcssor forcc
should be gn'cn a mandate drffercnt from thc
prcscnt one General Dclic called the prcsent
IFOR mandatc rnadcquatc bccause rt uas too
u'cak Hc argued tn partrcular that rt had forccd
IFOR to confirm thc drvrsron of Bosnra rathcr
than promotc rts rntegratron Thc rntcr-ethnrc
boundary hne had becomc a svmbol of
drsrntegration
141. Accordrng to the Bosnran authontles, the
mandatc for an IFOR successor forcc should at
lcast rncludc the follou'rng thrce marn tasks
- 
guardrng and protecting the
lntcrnatlonal bordcr of Bosnra and
Hcrzegovina. u-hrlc adopting a much
lou.er profilc at
boundan'hnc.
the intcr-ethnic
- 
enabhng thc return and resettlement of
rcfugccs and drsplaced persons.
rncludrng support for thc phvsrcal
protectlon of those people uho rvrsh to
return to thcrr homes.
searchmg for and arrcstmg \\'ar
cnmrnals rn ordcr to bnng them to tnal
beforc thc Internatronal Crrmrnal
Trrbunal rn Thc Hague
148. At thcrr rnformal meetrng rn Bergcn. on 25
Scptembcr 1996. NATO's Defcncc Mrnrstcrs
indrcatcd that the purposc of a post-IFOR force
*ould bc dctcrrencc and stabrhsatlon
l.l9 Among thc manv optlons for a neu' post-
IFOR forcc mandatc norr berng exammcd at
NATO. arc malntarnrng a safc envrronmcnt.
guarantecrng frccdom of movemcnt. contnbutrng
to drsarmament and dcmobihsatron. assumlng
pohcrng tasks. taking chargc of mrlrtan' tasks rn
ordcr to prevcnt hostrlrtres or attempts to
rntcrferc urth thc safe arcas. and contmurng to
assrst IINTAES rn eastcrn Slavonra
150. It must be clcarll undcrstood that the
pnman' task of an IFOR successor forcc urll
rcmaln the prcventron of a ncu. armed conflrct
bctu'een the three drfforcnt othnrc cntrtrcs and
ensurlng that the partres contrnue to obsen,e thc
mrlrtan'obhgations of thc Darton Agreement As
a conscqucncc. IFOR II rirll nccd to havc robust
forces at rts drsposal in ordcr to havc a dcterrcnt
effect
151. This apart. there arc tii'o drfficult issues
u'hrch u'rll necd partrcular attentlon u'hen the
mandate for an IFOR succcssor force rs dccrded
the rnter-cthnrc boundan' hne and freedom of
movement rn a broad scnsc.
152 Thc mtcr-ethnrc boundarl' hne (IEBL)
poscs a quandan' for x'hrch rt u'ould seem therc
ls no appropnatc solutron On thc one hand.
Anner I-A to the Darton Agrccmcnt. setting out
thc agrecment on mrlitan' aspccts of thc peace
settlement. imposed a zonc of separatron u'hrch
had to be controllcd and. rf need be. enforccd bv
IFOR It u'as rightlv thought that thrs u'ould be
thc bcst u'av of preventlng a fresh outbrcak of
rnter-ethmc fightrng Justrfiablr'. IFOR consid-
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cred thrs and the lmplementatlon of rclated
artrcles rn thc agreemcnt to be rts marn task As
a consequcnce. the IEBL has bccn transformed
lnto a geographrcal border betu'een the formcr
\\'arnng partlcs u'rth a ltmited number of u'cll-
guarded "border passagcs" On tho other hand.
thc basic rdca of the Dayton Agrecment uas to
crcatc a multr-cthnlc statc rvrth multr- and supra-
ethnrc rnstltutlons. m u'hrch thc populatlons on
both srdes \\'ere supposod to lrvc rn relatrve
harmonr'. To all appearances. houcver. the
reahsatron of this fundamcntal rdeal rvrll take
man\,\'cars.
153. Even an IFOR succcssor force ri'rll strll
have to be grven a pnmarJ'mandate to guard and
patrol thc IEBL. and to monltor or cnforce
comphancc iiith all thc artrcles of the agrccmcnt
on thc mrlrtan' aspccts of thc pcace settlemcnt
154 What can and should an IFOR successor
force do as rcgards frccdom of movemcnt') It
should be remembercd herc that under Articlc VI.
paragraph 3 d. of the abovementroned agrcemcnt,
IFOR has thc right "to obsen'c and prcvcnt
rntcrference urth the movement of crvrhan
populations, rcfugees. and drsplaced pcrsons. and
to rcspond appropnatell'to delibcratc vrolence to
hfe and persons"
155. Although rn the Darton Agrccment.
Bosnra and Herzcgo\1na \!as dcfined as a smgle.
multr-cthnrc statc. lt must bc recognrsed that
notu'rthstandrng thc manv cfforts madc b1' the
mt'nad ard organrsatrons and the omnrprcscnce of
IFOR. frccdom of movement. rncluding return
and rescttlcmcnt. rs strll onh' r.rrshful thrnking.
156 Should rt be a task of thc IFOR succcssor
force to rmpose and enforce freedom of
movement'/ The present commandrng officers of
IFOR all agree that thrs rs rmpossrble to achrcvc.
It rs argued that srnce the Day'ton Agrccmcnt
camc rnto effect rn Dcccmbcr 1995. people har,'c
- 
of therr olvn urll or under pressurc 
- 
tended to
movc from therr tradrtronal or temporary homes
rnto zoncs undcr the control of thcir rcspective
natronal authontres. A de 
-facto ethnrc drvrslon
has nou'been establishcd Whether one likes it
or not. there is no choicc but to accept the facts.
If peoplc do not feel confidcnt enough to mrx
rvith othcr ethmc cntrties, thev cannot bc forced
to do so The most one can hope for rs phased
rntegratron, u.hrch u'rll take many vears.
157. Overall. rt secms that. compared to thc
exrsting mandate. thc mandate for an IFOR
successor force should not be adapted IFOR's
expenence has demonstrated that the prescnt
mandate rs flexrblc enough and that rt allou's for
tntcrpretatrons enabling rt to respond to changrng
crrcumstances and requrrcmcnts.
XIV. IF0R and the future of NATO
158. It is no secret that operatlon "Jolnt
Endeavour". thc first large-scale militan'
operatlon ever mounted by NATO ground forces.
rs also a lrtmus tcst of the sohdantv and rntcrnal
cohesion of the Atlantrc Alhance IFOR has
rnvolved France cooperating closelv and
harmonrously rvrth the mrlrtan, structures of
NATO
I-59 In a speech at Georgetou'n Unrversitv on
20 Februan' 1996. Mr Solana cmphasrsed the
lmportance of the IFOR opcratron. not only'from
a mrlrtan' pornt of vreu'. but also bccause of its
urder signrficance He consrdered IFOR to bc a
modcl for the transatlantrc partnership of the 21st
centun'. IFOR reflected the ne\\' drrection
NATO has taken srnce the Gulf rvar rn order to
"enlarge our secuntv communitv to rnclude the
nerv democracies of central and eastern Europe"
It rcrnforced NATO's hnks urth all those
countrlcs. includrng Russra.
160. According to Secretan'-Gcneral Solana.
IFOR rvrll have a profound effcct on thc future
course of European sccuntv and on NATO's role
rn it. He has argucd that estabhshrng IFOR,
draun from over 30 countrics. has provrded a
model for future operatrons and dcmonstrated the
practical value of the Partncrshrp for Peace
Some observcrs have noted that the CJTF
concept rs havrng a trial run in Bosnra. dnven
partll' b1' the rcquirements of asscmbhng IFOR
from Alhancc and non-Alhance troops and asset
contnbutrons. At NATO rt rs thought that the
IFOR experience rr'ill facrlrtate rntensified
brlatcral dralogue on enlargcment, rvhrch NATO
u'rll conduct rvrth partners throughout 1996. and
u'rll rn;ect fresh momentum rnto NATO-Russian
rclatrons
161 Thc United States has clearly undcrstood
that if rt l'ere to pull out its ground troops. rts
European alhes u,ould do the same At the same
time. the Unrted Statcs is perfcctly u,ell aware
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that rts particrpatron rvrth ground troops in an
IFOR successor force rs vrtalh'rmportant for thc
future of NATO If the United States. as thc
leadrng nation rn NATO. u'ere to u'tthdrau' rts
troops from thc first major NATO ground forces
operatron ever mounted and leal'c rt to its alhes
to prolong NATO's mrlrtan'presence tn Bosnta.
it x'ould severelv damage its credrbilrtl' as the
guarantor of sccuritv rn Europe and sertouslv
leopardrsc thc future of NATO. A US
ruthdrarval n'ould also have a very negatn'e
mfluence on the attrtude France u'ould takc and
u'ould grve rt anothcr good rcason to instst on
thorough NATO restructunng and, in parttcular.
greater Europeanrsatron of NATO
162. In general. European pubhc support for
NATO rvould drmrnrsh x'hrle. at the samc time.
thc US pubhc mrght no longer scc anv good
reason to plcdge consrderable financtal and
mrlrtary contrrbutrons to an organtsatton rn u'hich
the United States no longer rvrshes to plal' a
preponderant role.
163. All thcsc consrderatrons have bccn
u'crghed by the US Government. uhrch at thrs
ven' momcnt rs emphasrsing the tmportancc of
NATO for Europe's secuntl' and insisting on
carlv enlargement of NATO to take m candrdates
from central Europe
164. For all these and manv other reasons, the
Unrted States has no othcr chorce than to
partrcrpate rn a post-IFOR force urth ground
troops and other vrtal assets rn the ficlds of
intelhgence. communlcatrons and logrstics It
wrll make thrs clcar soon after the presrdentral
elections m earlv November 1996.
XV Conclusions
165 IFOR's presence rn Bosnia has had manl'
positive effects. not least rn that rt has kept thc
peace On the other hand, rt should be noted that
some of IFOR's actrvrtrcs, which u'ere strrctlv
based on rts mandate. have created a situation
contrary to the basrc phrlosophl' of the Darton
Accords. u'hrch envisaged the creation of vrable
democratrc and multi- or supra-cthnrc
institutrons
166. ln practice, rt is clear that the inter-ethnrc
boundan' hne u'ith its lvrdc zone of separatron
for secuntl' reasons has been transformcd rnto a
geographrcal border betrvecn thc formcr rvarring
partres. at the same tlme creatlng the
prereqursrtes for a lastrng partrtron Under these
crrcumstanccs- the electtons 
- 
rvhrch tn fact took
placc far too carlr' 
- 
\\'ere bound to confirm thc
ambrtions of natronahst leaders u'ho had plunged
thc countn'into a u'ar resultrng m a separatton of
thc vanous cthnrc communtttes For thc
forcseeablc future. the elections have mcrclv
consohdatcd the barrrers separatrng the thrcc
ethnrc enclavcs. As a conscquence of the
natronahstrc election rcsults. the requrrement for
a contmued presenco of forergn troops has
bccome even more urgcnt
167. The electrons on 14 Septcmber mrght have
produccd a different result rf IFOR had been
grven thc task of pohcing the countn' tn order to
grvc democratrc forces a farr clcctoral chance and
allorv greater partrcrpatron bv the refugees u'ho
rverc chased from therr ongrnal homcs But none
of thc nations partrcipatrng rn IFOR u'ants to
entrust rt ruth a tough pohcrng mlsslon
168 The marn reason for a contrnucd presence
of foreign troops rn Bosnra ls to pronde
protectron and securitv for the populatron.
169 The IPTF could havc plaved a useful role
rn policing mlsslons, but rt has untrl norv been
rather ineffectrve bccause it lackcd the numbers.
the staff and the equrpment to meet rts task as
formulatcd in the mandate If Europe rs reallv
serious rn its ambrtion to re-estabhsh the rule of
lau-rn Bosnra and Hcrzegovlna. rt should scnd an
rnternatronal pubhc secuntv force to that
countrl, Thrs should be an armed bodv urth a
remlt to maintatn larv and order. ensurc frcedom
of movement and assrst the civilian poltce tn
other aspects of lau' cnforccment, rncluding
arrcsts.
170 Such a forcc should be brggcr than thc
present IPTF. consist of u'ell-trained officers
rvho are famrhar xith all the rssues mentioned rn
Artrcle III. paragraph l. of the prescnt agreement
on the IPTF and u'ho sharc conunon values and a
common language as regards the rssues to be
addressed Thrs force should bc adequatell'
equrpped to be ablc to implement its mandate
u'rthout thc support or asststance of an IFOR
successor force. It seems onll' logrcal that this
IPTF successor forcc should be organrsed under
WEU ausprces urth contributrons from member
states.
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171. A simple pull-out of foreign troops from
Bosnia lvithin a year ivrll lead to a partitron of
the country and a resumption of fightrng with the
Bosnian Muslims, who are strll rn the rveakest
positron, both economically and militanly.
172. Contrnued forergn involvement wrll at least
provrde Bosnra rvrth an opportunity to estabhsh
the mirumum number of constitutional bodies
rvhich are necessary for it to be run as an
organised and recognised state Only then urll
Bosnia be able to rvork on its future and address
the vital question of reconcrliatron without which
no lasting peace is possible
173. It u'ould be overambitious to draft a new
and different mandate for the necessan' IFOR
successor force. It has been argued in Chapter
XIII of this report that the present IFOR mandate
is flexible enough to meet even changing
requrrements
174. As regards the size of the post-IFOR
force, no figures have vet been given, but it
should consist of betu'een 25 000 and 30 000
men, with a core of three bngades, each
containing some 6 000 to 7 000 men. Most
probablr,. these forces wrll be hghter and more
mobile, but heaq' arms rvrll also have to be
included, if onll' to remmd the former warring
partres that any attempt to resume hostilities rvill
meet rvith an approprrate response.
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